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1.  The Problem: Protecting Public Values in Systems of Private Rights  
 
 In the American West, as in most societies of the world, water is a public resource 
of which private uses are allowed according to rules designed to protect and enhance 
broad public values.  Not everyone would agree on the definition of “public values,” but 
they generally attach to services that water provides that are important to large numbers 
of people in society, and they often are difficult to quantify in monetary terms.  A few 
examples illustrate the diverse services provided by water in the arid and semi-arid 
American West: preservation of biological diversity in healthy, functioning aquatic 
ecosystems; opportunities for aesthetic appreciation and spiritual renewal; recreational 
activities such as fishing, boating, swimming, bird watching, hiking, and scenic driving; 
cultural identity and historical activities related to streams and lakes; and concerns for 
future economic opportunities dependent on reliable water supplies.  Some of these 
services result in commercially valuable activities and industries; others lack easily 
measured monetary value but nonetheless support the economic well-being of society. 
 
 Since the first non-Native people came to the United States, the task of water law 
has been to allocate water to individuals and enterprises for utilitarian purposes and thus 
further a broad public interest in economic expansion.  Until it was so allocated, water 
remained a public resource.  Private uses allowed by law, however, could come into 
conflict with public uses.  For example, occasionally the public’s right to use waterways 
for boating came into conflict with uses that obstructed or depleted the flow of streams, 
or water contamination impaired domestic water uses.  Only in recent years has the law 
recognized that the rights of the public can be strong enough to trump individual 
economic uses.  
 
 Two phenomena have combined to create a greater consciousness of the public’s 
interest:  (1) scarcity of water sources; and (2) an increased understanding of the 
interconnection of forms of life (including human life) that are dependent on ecosystem 
health.  Scarcity of water in the United States results in part from a growth in urban 
demand and in part from the demand for free-flowing streams to sustain ecosystems and 
for human recreational uses.  Because most useful sites for major water projects have 
been developed or are off-limits for environmental reasons, the old response to water 
problems – developing new sources with structural projects – is no longer viable. 
 
 Most states’ water laws included nominal protections for the public interest, but 
historically these public rights had little significant impact on utilitarian purposes.  
Recently, however, state and federal laws have given more substantial, if uneven, 
protection to the public interest.  Today, there are many legal mechanisms for protecting 
the public interest.  Some are imposed at the point when waters are appropriated or when 
an existing use is changed.  Some apply when a dam or other major structure is built.   
Federal environmental laws have proven the strongest mechanisms for asserting and 
protecting diverse public interests. 
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In this section we examine the roots of competition between public and private 
rights.  In section II, we examine the means that have been adopted by state and federal 
legislatures and, in some cases, by courts to ensure that public interests are protected, 
with a particular emphasis on environmental protection.  Section III focuses on Indian 
water rights, which raise legal and equity issues similar to public interest concerns but are 
administered in a unique legal framework with a different set of problems. 
 
 
A. State Laws Create “Rights” That Allow Use Of Water For Private Gain 
 
Water law developed differently in the eastern and western parts of the United 
States.  In the East, landowners along streams and adjacent to lakes held “riparian rights” 
to the waters for the benefit of their lands.  Although “pure” statements of the law said 
that the landowner’s right was to the full flow of the stream, undiminished in quantity and 
quality, the law virtually always allowed water to be diverted from the stream by other 
riparian landowners for uses on their lands.  The riparian doctrine envisions water users 
on a particular watercourse sharing the water equitably, as expressed in the “reasonable 
use” rule.  In the West, by contrast, rights to use water were based on “prior 
appropriation” – the idea that the first person to put water to use should have a right to 
continue that use regardless of subsequent diversions by others, upstream or downstream.  
The prior appropriation doctrine explicitly allows an appropriator to put water to use far 
from the stream of origin—even in another watershed. 
 
These contrasting approaches reflect differences in the availability of water in the 
two regions as well as historical differences in land ownership and use.  The West is drier 
than the East, and the availability of water varies tremendously seasonally and 
geographically.  Thus, public policies developed in the middle of the nineteenth century 
aimed at providing basic human necessities and favored the productive use of water by 
permitting citizens to establish private rights and to protect their uses under the law.  In 
those days the land was almost entirely federal property or “public land” but the federal 
government did not dictate the manner of allocating water rights.  Indeed, it allowed 
states to create their own systems of assigning rights to use water located on government 
land. 
 
In this way, the government encouraged investments in irrigation systems to serve 
lands granted to private parties by the government and investments for mines located on 
public lands.  Like a subsidy, giving private parties free rights to use water created an 
incentive to economic activity that was considered necessary to accomplish regional and 
national goals of expansion and growth.  This was consistent with the government’s 
desire to promote western expansion and with local economic development efforts.   
 
Given the settlement patterns in this region, other departures from eastern water 
law were necessary.  For example, an appropriator did not need to be a landowner 
inasmuch as most of the land in the West in the nineteenth century was the property of 
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the federal government until it was patented (transferred) to homesteaders, miners, states, 
or railroads under various government programs.  Rights could be lost, however, if the 
holder of the rights discontinued the beneficial use.   
 
Today, rights in both eastern and western states are managed largely under permit 
systems, with administrative agencies issuing permits and administering water use 
according to rules most of which have been codified.  Not every state has a permit 
system; Colorado, for instance uses courts in place of administrative agencies. There are 
also marked differences among state programs.  But rights to use water – even under 
administrative permit systems – are generally considered a form of property.   
 
The property in water use is novel in two ways.  First, it is not a possessory right 
like rights to real or personal property that allow the owner to exclude others from access 
to or use of land or personality.  Second, under Anglo-American law (as under the legal 
systems of many cultures) water is considered a public resource in which all members of 
society have an interest.  Yet, as described above, the law provides means for private 
entities to hold property rights in use of the resource – “usufructuary rights.”  Most courts 
and commentators have said that these private rights must be created and exercised in 
ways that are consistent with the public’s interests. 
 
One attribute of the special kind of property right in water is that most systems 
have allowed the rights to be transferred. The West’s prior appropriation system did not 
restrict water rights to use on a specific plot of land or to a specific type of use.  Instead, 
water rights could be transferred by one user to another and water could be used 
wherever technology and economics would let it be moved.  Thus, as the region’s 
economies matured, its water rights system could adapt to satisfy growing and competing 
demands.  Even in the East, where water rights were ostensibly attached to specific land, 
exceptions were made by courts to allow water use on non-riparian lands in order to 
satisfy economic and social demands.   
 
An appropriator’s capacity to transfer a water right — that is, to transfer legal 
priority to use a quantity of water for a beneficial purpose — is a fundamental element of 
the “property” that the law recognizes in water use.  The transfer of water rights is subject 
to the condition that a change of use should not damage the water rights of any other 
water user.  This rule of “no injury” is the only universal restriction against water 
transfers.  Initially some states also limited transfers with other restrictions, but those 
restrictions have largely fallen with the need to move water from agricultural to urban 
uses.  Meanwhile, legislatures have imposed other restrictions that were considered 




B. Public Interests and Values 
 
 When water is allocated, developed, or transferred, interests of the public are 
often affected.  Almost any new or changed use of water has some effect on interests or 
values of the public, potentially depriving existing users of quantities of water, changing 
the flow of streams, or affecting water quality.  The effects include:  
 
• Environmental impacts, including reduced streamflows, loss of wetlands, 
damaged ecological systems including fish, wildlife, and riparian vegetation, and 
diminished water quality; 
 
• Harm to other public values that are difficult to quantify, such as aesthetics and 
loss of recreational opportunities;  
 
• Economic and social effects including the loss of income, employment, and 
business opportunities.   
 
Even pumping groundwater can have adverse effects where there is a connection 
between surface water and groundwater.  Extraction of groundwater can alter surface 
flow with potentially adverse effects on vegetation and riparian habitat.  The impacts are 
most frequently realized in the American West today as agricultural water rights are 
converted to urban uses.  Drying up formerly irrigated lands can lead to soil erosion and 
blowing dust and the invasion of noxious weeds. 
 
Historically, the emphasis on encouraging private investment and settlement in 
the West meant that these impacts received little consideration and no means of legal 
protection.  The “pure” prior appropriation doctrine required that water be physically 
removed from a stream and put to a recognized beneficial use in order to claim a legally 
protected water right.  Thus, those who enjoyed the instream benefits of water—
recreational boaters, anglers, resort owners depending on scenic vistas, for example—
could not claim a water right to assert their interests against those coming later to divert 
water from the stream.  Similarly, courts and administrative agencies did not aggressively 
assert broader public interests in water in years in which early water users established the 
most senior water rights.  The following section examines the tools available for such 
protection as well as new approaches developed in recent years. 
 
 
2. Public Interest Protection 
 
Generally, three types of activity affect the public’s interest in streams:  (1) 
diversions that deplete streamflows; (2) structures such as dams that obstruct streams and 
change flow patterns and temperatures; and (3) discharges that pollute waterways.  The 
first type of activity falls within an ambit that has been governed by state law.  The other 
two are largely regulated by federal law.  Because of a tradition in the United States of 
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allowing states to allocate quantities of water according to their own laws, the federal 
government’s environmental protection programs have raised federalism issues.  As a 
legal matter, the federal government has ample power to preempt state laws, but there is 
political resistance to national legislation and administrative actions that conflict with 
state water laws.  Although state laws recognize water as a public resource, states have 
done little to protect the public’s interest. 
 
This failure cannot be attributed to lack of legal authority.  The earliest state 
legislation or constitutional provisions asserted that grants of private rights in water must 
be consistent with the public interest or public welfare.  Other laws were more specific in 
preserving particular social or economic interests, especially agriculture.  For instance, 
some laws said that agricultural uses should be protected and speculation should be 
prevented in water.  Some state laws made water rights appurtenant to specific lands and 
flatly prohibited their transfer.   
 
Most water rights systems attempt to limit or prevent adverse impacts on the 
public from water uses at the time new users obtain permits.  This type of protection, 
however, is neither universal nor even among different states or adequate in most states.  
Processes limited to water rights holders exclude individuals and other entities that 
experience economic, environmental, and social impacts from water use and development 
but are not legally recognized water users.  There is pressure in most jurisdictions to 
include all such affected interests in the process of determining whether the public 
interest is served by a proposed water decision.  This is the primary means for dealing 
with the public interest in state water laws.  
 
Some states have laws regulating transfers away from a watershed or locale that 
are intended to protect the area of origin.  Local governments, Indian tribes, and rural 
communities in the area where water originates frequently suffer the greatest effects 
when water decisions benefit more populous areas or interests with greater political or 
economic power.  For example, water removed from nearby water sources and used 
elsewhere may inhibit the future development of local communities.  Water taken out of 
existing agriculture and transferred elsewhere may reduce agricultural employment in the 
area and impact agriculture-related businesses. For their part, municipalities that are 
required by law to maintain a certain water quality may find that reduced streamflow will 
increase their costs of treating sewage because it is more difficult to dissolve the 
discharged waste to meet water quality standards.  As tax bases decline and local 
businesses suffer there is a resulting decline in the ability of the local government to 
provide services to citizens.  The area, in turn, becomes less attractive to new businesses.  
Social impacts of water allocation, development, and transfer include changes in 
community structure, cohesiveness, and control of natural resources. 
 
Public interest concerns are often addressed indirectly through state laws creating 
programs to protect instream flows.  In addition, strong federal laws protecting 
endangered species, water quality, and wetlands provide additional support for the public 
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interest.  Laws that attempt to protect the public’s interest in water must address how to 
represent values other than those of water rights holders.  Public agencies usually receive 
comments from parties directly involved in decisions concerning the allocation, 
development, and transfer of water rights.  Sometimes members of the public also can 
comment; unless individuals have water rights, however, they are “third parties” to the 
transaction and historically they lacked a voice in the process.  Modern laws have begun 
to include various interests who were affected by the allocation of water rights or other 
decisions concerning water use in decision-making processes.   
 
Opportunities to protect the public interest arise in the water decision-making 
process when water is allocated to new uses, new projects are proposed, and when water 
uses are changed or transferred.  The discussion below describes several methods to 
integrate public values and assesses their effectiveness.  We conclude that there is 
considerable potential for the programs now in use in the United States but that they now 
provide incomplete protection for the interests of the public. 
 
 
A. Public Interest Review 
  
State laws often stipulate that water allocation must be consistent with the “public 
interest” or “public welfare.”  In practice, states rarely deny new uses or transfers in order 
to protect the public interest, but instead impose additional conditions on the 
appropriation or transfer.  Some state laws specifically protect an area of origin from 
movement of water to another area or watershed.  In the absence of statutory protection 
for the public interest courts have invoked the “public trust doctrine” to review existing 
water allocations.  A few examples illustrate the diversity of states’ public interest 
review. 
 
 State law requires Idaho’s Department of Water Resources director to determine 
whether a proposed water use is in conflict with “the local public interest,” but the statute 
does not define this standard (Idaho Statutes, sec. 42-203A).  Therefore, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has read the statute with reference to other laws of Idaho and of other 
states that define the public interest (Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (1985)).  Following 
that ruling, the Director of Water Resources has convened hearings aimed at reaching 
decisions that ensure “the greatest benefit possible to the public [from public waters] for 
the public” (Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d at 448 (citing Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 
N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910)).  Affected citizens can present evidence about 
matters such as aesthetics, recreation, fish, and ecosystem functions that will be impacted 
by the proposed water decision.  The agency considers not only benefits to the applicant 
but also economic effects, alternative uses, minimum stream flows, wastewater, and 
conservation.   
 
Not all states apply the same public interest requirements to changes of use or 
transfers that they impose on new appropriations.  The Supreme Court of Utah, however, 
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upheld the application of the same criteria to changes in use that it applies to new 
appropriations (Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (1989)).  In Nevada, a statute requires 
the state to reject an application for a water transfer that would result in damaging the 
public interest (Nevada Revised Statute, sec. 533.370(3)).  Wyoming, one of the few 
states with a special process to evaluate transfers, considers potential economic losses to 
the community relative to the benefits of the transfer and the availability of other sources 
of water (Wyoming Statutes Annotated, sec. 41-4-503).  California, through the State 
Water Resources Control Board, reviews proposed transfers to determine if they would 
cause an unreasonable effect on the economy in the area of origin or on fish, wildlife, or 
other water uses (California Water Code, sec. 109).   
  
Although almost every state in the West, except one Colorado, uses some type of 
process to review the public interest in water decisions, all could improve the way in 
which they review the effects.  The majority of the states lack clear standards to define 
the public interest that they are trying to protect.  Many of the social, economic, and 
ecological interests affected by water allocation, transfer, and use are simply not included 
in the considerations of state agencies.  If the elements constituting the public interest 
were comprehensively articulated, government employees could use them as a guide for 
state policy in resolving conflicts among competing interests and to understand better the 
tradeoffs inherent in any water decision.  Comprehensive water planning is another way 
to articulate both the elements of the public interest and state policies related to them.   
 
 
 B. Area of Origin Protection Laws 
  
The prior appropriation doctrine historically did not limit where water was used.  
A few states have enacted special laws to limit water transfers from one watershed to 
another.  These “area-of-origin protection laws” provide a specific type of public interest 
review that focuses on the area where water originates.  Such restrictions apply to new 
appropriations as well as to transfers of existing rights. 
 
 California’s population distribution depends on removing huge quantities of water 
from sparsely populated areas with copious water to growing cities where water demand 
is high.  On paper, the legal protections for areas of origin in California are strong.  For 
example, one state law gives an exporting area an absolute priority to the future use of the 
water over the priority of the importing area (California Water Code, sec. 10505).  
Another law reserves to the county of origin all of the water necessary for its future 
development (California Water Code, sec. 10505.5).  As a practical matter, however, it 
would be difficult for an area or county of origin to stop exporting water and to cut off an 
urban area that has grown dependent on it.  Montana has a law that requires participation 
of the state in transfers of water out of a watershed; large transfers are limited and the 
state is obliged to consider public interest factors (Montana Code Annotated, sec. 85-2-
402(5)).  An Arizona law gives irrigation districts a veto over exports of water beyond 
their boundaries (Arizona Revised Statutes, sec. 45-172(5)). 
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 Colorado allows conservation districts to make transbasin diversions from the 
watershed of the Colorado River only if they will not inhibit or increase in cost the 
present or future water supply for the exporting area (Colorado Revised Statutes 
Annotated, sec. 37-45-118(1)(b)(II)).  The law is interpreted to require districts that 
import water to the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains to construct special reservoirs 
for “compensatory storage” in the watershed of the Colorado River (Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v. Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District, 610 P.2d 81, 84 (Colo. 1979)).  There are no similar restrictions 
against large cities such as Denver that import the majority of the water from distant 
watersheds in Colorado.   
 
 State restrictions designed specifically to inhibit transfers of water beyond state 
borders raise constitutional problems.  The United States Supreme Court has decreed that 
water is essentially an “article of commerce,” and restrictions that discriminate against 
interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 
(Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982)).  To be constitutional, the 
regulation of water use must be impartial, treating equally users of water within and 
without the state. 
 
 
 C. Public Trust Doctrine 
 
 The examples described above require public interest review before a new water 
use or changed water use is approved.  In some instances, however, courts have held that 
a state’s decision to permit private use of public resources can be voided when water 
rights are allocated or transferred without review of the public interest (National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); In re Water Use Permit 
Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Hawaii 2000)).  The public trust doctrine recognizes that water 
is fundamentally a public resource and that private interests in it should be advanced 
without inhibiting the public benefits of using it.  As applied, the doctrine allows a court 
to reexamine established water rights in order to ensure that public values are protected, 
including the public value of environmental protection.  The doctrine has its origins in 
civil and common law principles that recognize that recognize the public servitude such 





D. Instream Flow Maintenance Programs  
 
 In recent years almost all the western states have passed laws protecting instream 
flows.  These states either appropriate water rights to themselves that are used to maintain 
streamflow levels or they remove from appropriation by private parties the amount of 
water that is necessary to maintain desired flows.  At present, only Arizona and Alaska 
permit individuals and private organizations to appropriate waters for instream flows.  In 
all other states only a state agency can hold the right.   
 
 Statutory programs to protect streamflows are criticized for being ineffective 
because typically by the time a state appropriates rights for instream flows, the water in 
the stream has already been fully appropriated by others.  Therefore, the state’s new 
instream flow appropriations are so junior in time that it is possible for senior rights to 
dry up the stream most of the time.  
 
 Some states, however, permit the state to buy or accept donations of senior water 
rights with priorities sufficient to maintain streamflows all or most of the time.  
Ultimately, effective protection of the streamflows will depend on the acquisition of 
senior water rights in most western streams.  Private groups in some states have formed 
“water trusts” to finance purchases of senior water rights; these rights must be transferred 
to the state agency authorized to hold instream flow rights unless the state allows private 
entities to hold them.   
 
 Instream flow protection laws do not always protect all of the public uses for 
which flowing water is needed.  The Colorado statute permits appropriations of a quantity 
of water sufficient “to protect the natural environment to a reasonable degree” (Colorado 
Revised Statutes Annotated, sec. 37-92-102(3)).  The state board that holds the rights has 
interpreted this language narrowly and has used it almost entirely to protect cold-water 
fish such as trout.  Thus, the law is unavailable to protect water quality, riparian 
vegetation, wetlands, or recreation. 
 
 
 E. Reserved Rights for Federal Public Lands 
 
 In much of the West, large expanses of land are owned by the federal government 
and managed for multiple public values.  The government has reserved some of these 
lands for specific public purposes that require water: national forests, wildlife refuges, 
recreation areas, wilderness areas, and military bases.  Although military bases require 
water for traditional consumptive uses, many of the other land designations may require 
water for instream flow uses.   
 
The doctrine of federal reserved water rights says that the federal government, 
when setting aside lands for public purposes that require water, impliedly reserved rights 
water sufficient to fulfill those purposes (Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)).  
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This is a court-made doctrine that traces to precedents dealing with the establishment of 
Indian reservations and its development is discussed below in Part III (Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)).  In the context of federal public lands, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has read the doctrine restrictively to limit rights to the minimum amount 
of water necessary to accomplish the explicitly articulated federal purposes of each 
reservation (Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976)).  It has also construed 
legislation creating federal reservations narrowly.  For instance, national forests do not 
have reserved water rights for the instream flows needed for fish and wildlife because 
they were created primarily to provide a supply of timber (United States v. New Mexico, 
438 U.S. 696 (1978)).  In any event, the U.S. government has rarely taken action to 
enforce reserved rights, even where it has been found to have such rights.   
 
 
F.  Environmental Regulation  
 
 Environmental laws that deal with the protection of water quality, wetlands, and 
endangered species indirectly deal with the effects of water allocation, development, use, 
and transfer.  Nearly all these laws are federal and therefore federalism concerns arise 
when they conflict with or curtail the uses of water under state water rights.  With the 
exception of state statutes required to implement federal programs, state environmental 
laws are generally not very strong or effective in protecting the public’s interest in water. 
 
 The sections below summarize the provisions of major federal laws that impact 
water allocation and management.  In section G we discuss collaborative approaches, 
which typically work outside of established institutions.  These approaches frequently are 
used when the actual environmental regulations are enforced. 
 
 
1.  Environmental Impact Assessment Requirements   
 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.A. secs. 
4321-4370, 4321(2)(a)(1)) requires the assessment of potential environmental impacts of 
proposed “major federal actions.”  After a public participation process, an agency 
completing this analysis explains its decision in a document known as an environmental 
impact statement (42 U.S.C.A. sec. 4332(2)(c)).  NEPA applies to proposals that require 
a federal approval or license or to use water in federal facilities where there will be a 
significant environmental impact.  A few western states, including California and 
Washington, have adopted laws with similar requirements for projects permitted or 
sponsored by the state.  The state or federal laws that require an assessment of 
environmental impacts are important mechanisms for evaluating the effects of water 
development and transfer.  The information that is developed is valuable in providing a 
fair and comprehensive review of the public interest.  NEPA is essentially a procedural 
requirement and does not mandate that a final decision be environmentally benign.  It 
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2.  Clean Water Act   
 
Water quality can decline with excessive depletions of a watercourse because the 
contaminants become more concentrated in the remaining flows.  With some exceptions, 
however, state water agencies consider exclusively issues related to the quantity being 
allocated and not the quality. 
  
Generally water quality is protected by the Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C.A. 
secs. 1271-1387).  Although CWA is a federal law, it is administered by most states.  
Under the CWA, anyone who makes a “point source” discharge of pollutants into the 
water must have a permit that limits the quantity of particular pollutants according to 
standards established by the federal government (33 U.S.C.A. sec. 1362(14)).  The permit 
also must require sufficient limitations on discharges to protect the overall quality of the 
watercourse receiving the waste water.  Standards for water quality are set by the states 
and are specific to particular waterways.  The permitting program has effectively 
regulated industries and municipal sewage treatment plants that discharge wastes into 
rivers and lakes.   
 
The CWA does not deal with declines in water quality caused by other than point 
source discharges.  There are provisions in the Act that encourage states to take action to 
control non-point sources and a requirement that they identify waterways where the water 
quality is not effectively controlled by point source regulation.  The states are then to 
impose “total maximum daily loads” of pollutants.  Lacking any firm enforcement 
mechanisms and surrounded by political criticism, this part of the program had not been 
fully implemented.  The nation still has neither an effective program to prevent non-point 
source pollution nor any formal controls of water depletions to protect water quality. 
The potential effects of depletions from new diversions or transfers away from the 
stream on water quality can be considered as part of the process of public interest review 
but this is rarely done because states typically separate their administration of water 
allocation and water quality (Getches et. al. 1991).  More typically, water laws protect the 
right to use a quantity of water even if it causes deterioration in water quality.  When 
state water allocation laws come in conflict with water quality laws, the right to use water 
is recognized as superior to the protection of water quality. 
 
 
3. Riverbed and Wetland Protection 
 
A special program under §404 of the Clean Water Act regulates “dredging and 
filling” of “navigable waters.”  The statute defines navigable waters as all “waters of the 
United States.”  This has been interpreted administratively to include all adjacent 
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wetlands, and wetlands are defined as any area capable of sustaining riparian vegetation.  
The activities covered are more than traditional dredge and fill operations undertaken to 
deepen channels for navigation.  Depositing “fill material” can include any construction 
in a waterway or wetland.  Thus, the statute covers water projects, dams, and diversion 
structures.   
 
The impact of § 404 on water development is much greater than pollutant 
discharge regulations.  Almost any type of construction activity to develop or use water 
occurs in or on the banks of a stream or technically interferes with a wetland.  Where 
wetlands are affected by water development activity, §404 requires the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a global review of the public interest.  In practice, 
the authority exercised by the Corps of Engineers is not nearly as broad as its powers, 
although the potential scope of its public interest inquiry is great.   
 
 
4. Endangered Species Protection   
 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) (16 U.S.C.A. secs. 1531-1543) is 
another federal statute that can affect proposals to divert, develop, or transfer water.  The 
ESA absolutely prohibits any action by the federal government that would jeopardize the 
continued existence of an endangered species.  Federal agencies considering activities 
that could jeopardize endangered species are required by §7 of the ESA to consult with 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to determine the effects of the development or action 
on the habitat of any endangered species.  If, in the opinion of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service the action would jeopardize the endangered species, the action cannot go forward 
unless there is a reasonable and prudent alternative that will not cause the jeopardy.   
 
The ESA is extremely powerful because nearly every major water project – not 
just those undertaken directly by the federal government – requires some kind of federal 
approval (such as under §404 of the Clean Water Act), or receives federal financing.  
Thus, the ESA has proved to be a formidable barrier to water development that could be 
destructive of fish or wildlife habitat where endangered species are found.  The Act, 
indeed, may be the most significant law affecting new water development. 
  
Another section of the statute, §9, prohibits actions that “take” or “harass” an 
endangered species.  These terms are broadly interpreted to include harm to the habitats 
of endangered species.  Unlike §7, which is specific to federal agency actions, §9 extends 
to private actions.  The section has rarely been applied to private water development or 
uses.  In one exceptional case, however, the Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District 
killed several Chinook salmon while operating its pump diversion facility.  The Chinook 
are an endangered species.  The state court enjoined the irrigation district’s activities, 
prohibiting it from possessing or taking the endangered species (Department of Fish and 




5.  Federal Power Act  
 
For many years, federal law has required licenses for hydroelectric-generating 
dams located on navigable waterways or their tributaries.  Congress enacted the Federal 
Power Act of 1920 (16 U.S.C.A. sec. 790 et. seq.) to promote the coordinated 
development of rivers, and established a licensing agency known as the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) to grant licenses for uses “best adapted to a 
comprehensive plan” for each river (16 U.S.C.A. sec. 803).  FERC considers a variety of 
issues related to economics and other subjects.  Although the Federal Power Act contains 
a provision saying that nothing in it shall affect state water laws, and another requires that 
an applicant for a license must show that it has complied with state laws, states cannot 
prevent a dam under the jurisdiction of FERC from being licensed and constructed (First 
Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S. 152 (1946)).  
Thus, state water law is subordinate to FERC’s licensing authority. 
 
Especially relevant to protection of the public interest is the mandate in the 
Federal Power Act that FERC’s planning for a river should take into account all 
“beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes” (Udall v. Federal Power 
Commission, 387 U.S. 428, 449 (1967) (citing 16 U.S.C. 797(e)).  This has been held to 
include consideration of the effects of the dam on anadromous fish (Udall v. Federal 
Power Commission, 387 U.S. at 450).  Not surprisingly, older projects were built with 
little concern for such uses as fish and wildlife or recreation and subsequently have 
proved to be highly detrimental to fish.  Historically, FERC was primarily concerned 
with maximizing a river’s potential for hydroelectric power development.  The agency 
did try to prevent negative impacts on navigation, but other public interests were not 
serious obstacles to the construction of dams. 
 
In recent years, however, as the licenses for old dams expired often after a term of 
fifty years, the commission has been more mindful of other public interests.  This is 
partly the result of amendments to the Act and partly because of the enactment of the Fish 
and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (16 U.S.C.A. secs. 661-667, 661) which requires 
FERC to give “equal consideration” to protection of fish and wildlife.   
 
FERC now requires dam owners to release water in amounts and at times needed 
for fish and wildlife and other environmental purposes.  These requirements have brought 
FERC into conflict with state agencies in some cases.  Typically, the conflict has been 
over whether FERC or the state that issues water rights for the project has the last word 
on how much water must be left in the stream or that must by-pass the dam to protect fish 
habitat.  In one major case, the state of California tried to impose requirements on a 
power company for the benefit of fish.  The Supreme Court held that the preemptive 
force of the Federal Power Act left such matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
FERC, so that the less protective requirements would apply (California v. Federal 
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Energy Regulatory Commission, 495 U.S. 490 (1990)); it is sufficient if FERC considers 
the recommendations of the state fish and wildlife agency. 
 
FERC’s reputation for environmental protection is mixed.  Although it has a 
strong environmental mandate, it often fights tenaciously to license dams that are subject 
to more lax requirements than a state would impose.  There are, however, modern 
examples of the agency taking significant protective action.  In some cases, state laws are 
not strict and FERC’s requirements, such as requiring by-pass flows for fish, are the only 
public interest requirements.  In a few recent cases, the commission has considered 
requiring removal of dams subject to relicensing in order to restore a fishery.  The 
Edwards Dam in Maine, for instance, was removed in 1837.  Two dams that have 
blocked salmon migration in the Elwha River basin in Washington are targeted for 
removal, and a hydroelectric dam at the confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork 
Rivers in Montana may give way for a whitewater recreation park. 
 
 
6. Wild and Scenic River Designation 
  
Under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C.A. secs. 1271-1287) 
rivers may be designated by Congress or by a state-nomination process to be protected 
against future development that would impair their free-flowing character as it exists at 
the time of designation.  The primary effect of designation is that the federal government 
under its various regulatory programs cannot authorize water projects that obstruct the 
flow of the river.  For instance, FERC cannot license new projects on these rivers.  In 
addition, designation of a river effectively reserves a water right to the federal 
government preventing depletions of the stream that would impair the flows to the extent 
that the purpose of the designation would be defeated. 
 
 
7. River Restoration Laws 
 
  In the past decade, Congress enacted several laws calling for large-scale 
restoration of river environments.  The Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 (106 Stat. 
4600), for example, ordered the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to change the way it 
operates the Glen Canyon Dam in order to improve the downstream riparian and aquatic 
habitats.  As a result of the act, the Bureau conducted an experimental “flood flow” in 
1996–a large release intended to mimic historical spring runoff conditions in which high 
water levels with heavy sediment loads restored beaches and revitalized backwater native 
fish-rearing habitats.  The act explicitly directed the Bureau to manage the Glen Canyon 
Dam to protect, mitigate, and improve the natural and cultural resources of the river 
downstream–a dramatic expansion of the project’s purposes when compared with the 
original authorizing legislation. 
 
 17
In another example of legislatively mandated habitat restoration, the Central 
Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (106 Stat. 4706-4731) directed the Secretary of 
the Interior to dedicate and manage annually 800,000 acre-feet of water from the Central 
Valley Project for the primary purpose of fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration in 
California’s vast and fertile Sacramento-San Joaquin River Valley.  Although this water 
was classified as “surplus,” irrigators participating in the large federal project had 
enjoyed its use during dry years, and thus faced cutbacks as a result of the new emphasis 
on habitat restoration.  The act also required these water users to pay surcharges on 
irrigation water to finance environmental restoration.  The law’s enactment culminated a 
successful lobbying effort by a coalition of diverse interests: environmental groups, 
commercial and sport fishermen, duck hunters, waterfowl organizations, Native 
Americans, and urban and business interests. 
 
 
 G.  Ad Hoc Negotiations and Other Collaborative Processes 
 
 Collaborative efforts among stakeholders (water rights holders and others) show 
promise for resolving conflicts between public interests and private rights shaped 
particularly for the river or locale in which the conflict arises.  Dozens of initiatives 
throughout the western U.S. demonstrate the potential for these locally based, problem-
solving entities.   
 
 In some cases, such groups have solved problems of diminished streamflows in 
popular fisheries by crafting voluntary agreements among water rights holders to change 
the timing of withdrawals; in return, fisheries proponents have agreed not to seek 
regulatory changes to the appropriators’ water rights. 
 
Sometimes third parties affected by a proposed water development, use or transfer 
are able to persuade the proponents to take voluntary action to protect the interests of the 
public.  Unless there is a public process provided for under the law, it is difficult to 
initiate these negotiations.  Only when third parties have sufficient political or legal 
leverage (for example, the threat of a veto under the Endangered Species Act) will the 
proponent of the development activity participate in negotiations.  The fundamental 
problem with relying on negotiated resolutions of problems caused for third parties or the 
public in general as a result of water development or use is that the results are a function 
of the political power of the objectors.  The results, then, are not consistent among similar 
projects and often provide incomplete relief where the objectors lack political or legal 
strength.   
 
At the least, collaborative groups offer a forum for better expression of public 
interests.  As they grow larger in scale of focus (such as whole river basins or major 
drainages) and number of participants, the proceedings take on more legal and political 





H.  Conclusion 
 
Everyone has an interest in the way water is used.  When water is committed to 
new uses, or those uses are changed, or water is transferred, it creates impacts on the 
values of people besides those with water rights.   
 
It is extremely important to ensure adequate protection for values that are widely 
held and of substantial interest to the public.  Economic theory indicates that society will 
gain from the efficient allocation and reallocation of water rights; this argues for 
operation of free markets without excessive restrictions.  Better protection of third parties 
increases the costs to the government of reviewing proposed transactions.  Nevertheless, 
it is the obligation of governments to find effective and efficient methods to preserve the 
values of members of the public affected by water decisions.   
 
Taken together, the several mechanisms for protection of the public interest create 
rather uneven results.  In some cases there is ample protection of fish and wildlife and no 
consideration for recreation.  In some states there is little protection under prevailing 
water laws, so that the only type of protection is under federal laws.  In other places state 
and federal agencies compete for control of water projects, not necessarily to ensure 
greater protection but to preserve their relative scope of jurisdiction.   
 
One way to add greater predictability for both the public and for water developers 
would be for each state to establish a dynamic and comprehensive system of water 
planning.  Issues like the impacts on rural communities, environmental effects, protection 
of fisheries, wetlands, recreation, and drinking water can all be covered as well as flood 
control.  Only a few states have this type of water plan.  Such a plan can provide 
standards that enable the decision maker under almost any of the programs now in place 
to judge a proposal more wisely and fairly.  A comprehensive plan would include a 
panoply of values and interests that could be affected by the development, transfer, or use 
of water.  The plan could also discuss the relative importance to society of the values and 
their impacts. 
 
Experts in the field of water law and policy should pursue methods to reduce the 
costs and increase the benefits of water use by providing broader and more effective 
protection of the public against negative effects of water decisions.  A combination of 
administrative review designed to protect the interests of the public, laws to protect 
instream flows, and environmental regulation has provided some protection in the 
western states.  Protection could be further improved by establishing a planning process 
to develop water policy that is more coherent and predictable. 
 
 
3.  Indigenous Rights and Interests 
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Protecting the rights of indigenous peoples arguably should be part of advancing 
the public interest.  But it is more complicated because the “public interest” furthered by 
satisfying national obligations to tribes sometimes conflicts with the policies or asserted 
governmental authority of state governments.  In this respect, the conflict is similar to the 
tension between federal enactments that promote the national environmental interest and 
state policies that arise from more localized or short-term interests.  Besides the 
complication created by the federal system in the United States, protection of Indian 
rights also has been inhibited by the tribes’ lack of influence in national politics. On the 
other hand, U.S. law recognizes certain sovereign rights and property interests of tribes. 
 
The foundational principles in Indian law tracing to the earliest days of the nation 
define a fiduciary relationship in which the national government is charged with 
protecting the rights of tribes in their lands.  The same early cases give the Congress 
broad powers to implement this obligation but also to extinguish rights when lawmakers 
determine that it is in the interest of the country to do so.  This great federal power in the 
area of Indian affairs has been invoked frequently to limit states’ efforts to encroach on 
the property rights and self-governing authority of tribes within their territory.   
 
In modern times the federal policy toward Indian tribes has favored self-
determination and economic self-sufficiency, but this has not always been the case.  In 
the late nineteenth century, for instance, national policy sought to assimilate Indians into 
the mainstream of society by ending their communal pursuits, breaking up tribal land 
holdings, and promoting individual farm cultivation.  Whether the national goal has been 
to promote individual or collective self-sufficiency on the lands reserved for tribes and 
their members, access to sufficient amounts of water to make the lands useful has always 
been essential.   
 
Water is necessary for agriculture in arid environments and to maintain the habitat 
needed to sustain fish life.  And for tribes, the integrity of land, water, and the natural 
world is often at the heart of traditional cultures and spiritual life.  Tribes of the Great 
Plains were placed on reservations and told to give up their far-ranging hunts.  In the 
desert Southwest, some tribes had established irrigation cultures using the sparse and 
seasonal streams.  In the Northwest and Great Lakes regions reservations were created 
that limited the homelands and the historic fishing pursuits of native peoples.   
 
In each case, encroaching populations of non-Indians and the resulting 
competition for water and water-dependent resources threatened the ability of Indians to 
survive on their reservations.  Nonetheless, national policies in the era of homesteading 
and westward expansion encouraged this settlement.  The resulting establishment of non-
Indian communities and creation of property rights in land and water have conflicted and 
competed with the Indians’ capacity to use natural resources.  
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In the early days of the twentieth century the United States Supreme Court 
announced a remarkable doctrine of water rights that favored Indian tribes in their 
attempts to secure sufficient water to make their reservations useful.  The “reserved rights 
doctrine” guaranteed tribes the right to use water to fulfill the purposes for which their 
reservations were established.  The right could be exercised anytime in the future, even if 
non-Indians had used the water first and had been granted rights under state law.   
 
The history of the tribes’ exercise of their ostensibly bold and potent reserved 
water rights for Indian reservations has been problematical.  The tribes have lacked 
capital to put their water rights to use and now they compete with non-Indians who have 
built their economies using the water to which the Indians are rightfully entitled.  Tribes 
have remained in a state of poverty and reservations are largely undeveloped.  Some 
tribes near population centers have sought economic development by legalizing 
gambling.  Their independent sovereignty makes them immune from state laws 
prohibiting gambling.  But in most places long-term, economic well-being and cultural 
survival on their reservations depend on asserting and using their water rights for 
agricultural or industrial development.   
 
Increasingly, tribes have pressed for a vindication of their theoretically great but 
actually underutilized water rights.  The non-Indians know that the inchoate rights of the 
tribes pose a threat to their economic security.  Because investments and property values 
are undermined by uncertainty, non-Indians and the western states that tend to support 
non-Indian interests have also urged that Indian water rights should be legally 
determined.  Judicial processes now underway in most states are lengthy and expensive.  
In recent years several tribes’ water rights have been resolved in negotiated settlements 
and implemented through federal legislation.  This remains the preferred method of 
quantifying tribal water rights primarily because it infuses federal funding into solutions 
that enable tribes to use their water rights and it protects established non-Indian uses. 
 
 
A.  A Brief History of Indian Water Rights 
 
There are hundreds of Indian reservations in the western United States.  In the 
nineteenth century, tribes who once hunted, fished, and gathered over large expanses of 
land were confined to reservations in order to reduce conflict with white settlers.  In 
successive treaties and agreements the tribes agreed, often reluctantly or under pressure, 
to move onto smaller reservations.  Typically the government sought to convert the 
Indians into farmers.  Because the West is an arid region where agriculture is difficult 
without irrigation, most reservations required a supply of water if the Indians were to 
sustain life. 
 
Other reservations were located along rivers to ensure that Indians could continue 
fishing to sustain their livelihoods and culture.  Again, water was necessary to fulfill the 
purposes of the reservation.  As a general matter, it is correct to say that all reservations 
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were intended to be permanent homelands for the tribes, where they could survive and be 
self-sufficient.  Invariably, the reservations required water.   
 
The fundamental legal principle giving rise to Indian water rights is stated simply: 
The establishment of a reservation results in an implied reservation of a right to take 
water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of reserving the land for the Indians.   In the words 
of the United States Supreme Court:    
 
The reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which the Indians had the 
right to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits and wants of a 
nomadic and uncivilized people.  It was the policy of the Government, it was the 
desire of the Indians to change those habits and to come pastoral and civilized 
people.  If they should become such the original tract was too extensive, by a 
smaller tract would be inadequate without a change of conditions.  The lands were 
arid and, without irrigation, were practically valueless. . . .   The Indians had 
command of the lands and the waters – command of all their beneficial use, 
whether kept for hunting, “and grazing roving herds of stock,” or turned to 
agriculture and the arts of civilization.  Did they give up all this?  Did they reduce 
the area of their occupation and give up the waters which make it valuable or 
adequate? (Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908)). 
 
The Supreme Court announced the doctrine of “reserved water rights” in Winters.  
The case arose on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana where the Indians had 
been placed after a series of treaties that had limited them to a small fraction of their 
former territory.  The Court recognized the government’s intention of “civilizing” the 
Indians by making individual farmers of them and breaking up the communally held 
tribal lands.  The government plan involved dividing up the reservation lands into 
individual land holdings, allotting the land to heads of Indian families to be cultivated, 
and then opening the rest of the land on and off the reservation for non-Indian 
homesteaders. Without sufficient irrigation water for the reservation, this civilizing 
scheme would fail.  If the individual allotment policy fell, lands desired by settlers – the 
so-called “surplus lands” on reservations and former reservations – would not be 
available for white settlement. 
  
It would have been grossly unfair to the Indians to confine them to reservations 
without the means to eke out a living.  Moreover, the plan for obtaining and distributing 
former Indian land to non-Indians would have failed if the tribes could not survive on 
their reservations.  Thus, the reserved rights doctrine of Winters became the cardinal rule 
of Indian water rights.  It was later applied to federal reservations of land for parks, 
forests, military bases, and other public uses (Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 
(1963)).  As with Indian lands the quantity of water reserved depended on the purposes 
for which the reservation was established. 
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Over the years, the reserved rights doctrine has promised more than it has 
delivered.  The government has rarely applied it in litigation to assert rights as against 
non-Indian water users.  The Indians themselves, until about thirty years ago, often 
lacked their own attorneys to represent them in protecting their water rights.  They were 
sometimes represented by government attorneys in water litigation where the government 
had a conflict of interest.  Meanwhile, non-Indians built dams and diverted water from 
streams and initiated uses that depended on that water.   
 
Non-Indian water development was often planned and paid for by the federal 
government, which is ironic considering the well-established legal principle in American 
Indian law that the government is charged with responsibility to act for the benefit of 
Indian tribes.  The National Water Commission found in its 1973 report that: 
 
Following Winters, . . . the United States was pursuing a policy of encouraging 
the settlement of the West and the creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands.  
In retrospect, it can be seen that this policy was pursued with little or no regard 
for Indian water rights and the Winters doctrine.  With the encouragement, or at 
least the cooperation, of the Secretary of the Interior – the very office entrusted 
with the protection of all Indian rights – many large irrigation projects were 
constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered Indian Reservations, 
sometimes above and more often below the Reservations.  With few exceptions 
the projects were planned and built by the Federal Government without any 
attempt to define, let alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might have had 
in the waters used for the projects. . . .  In the history of the United States 
Government’s treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights 
for use on the Reservations it set aside for them is on of the sorrier chapters 
(National Water Commission 1973, 474-475). 
 
Many decades after the Supreme Court first articulated the reserved water rights 
doctrine, Indian water rights finally gained considerable attention when the Court issued 
its opinion in Arizona v. California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)).  The case involved an 
allocation of the Colorado River’s flow among three of the states that touch the river.  
The United States, which was involved in the case because the river also crosses 
extensive Indian and federal lands, claimed reserved rights for five tribes along the river.  
The Supreme Court awarded those tribes 900,000 acre-feet of water per year – a huge 
quantity of water – which it determined by calculating how much water would be 
required to irrigate all of the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations. This sent a 
strong message to water users all over the West that Indian claims could be made to 
formidable amounts of water.  The reserved rights doctrine had been idle, but it was far 
from dead. 
 
As explained earlier, prior appropriation was the historical method for allocating 
water in the American West.  Although this doctrine has been altered in various ways and 
embellished with rules that satisfy important public purposes, most of the West’s water 
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long ago was allocated to the earliest users of water.  The most valuable rights are the 
oldest because in times of shortage the holders of those rights can insist on delivery of the 
full quantity of water to which they are entitled.  Accordingly, when senior users assert 
their rights, the most junior users often must curtail their water uses.  The Supreme Court 
created reserved water rights to fit into the priority system, with a tribe’s priority date 
established by the date its reservation was established.  Because most reservations were 
established more than one hundred years ago, the accompanying water rights are usually 
quite senior. 
 
This ability to fix a precise priority date for a tribe’s water right makes it possible 
to determine which uses potentially must be cut back in order to allow water to flow to 
the reservation.  That is, the tribe’s position in the system of priorities is easy to 
determine.  But the scope of the right – and thus its impacts on other water users -- 
remains uncertain until the quantity of water to which the tribe is entitled is determined.  
This is not an issue when non-Indians’ water rights are established in the prior 
appropriation system because the quantity of their rights is determined based on the 
amount of water actually used in the past.  The fact that reserved rights can exist without 
a history of actual use, then, can deprive neighboring water users of certainty.  This lack 
of certainty can frustrate non-Indian neighbors when they seek to make investments or 
borrow money based on assumptions about how much water is generally available to 
them. 
 
One solution to this uncertainty is to quantify Indian reserved rights.  This can be 
done judicially by asking a court to decide how much water is necessary to fulfill the 
purposes of a reservation.  Where the purpose of setting up the reservation was to allow 
the Indians to pursue agriculture, the courts follow the formulation in Arizona v. 
California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)) based on the reservation’s practicably irrigable acreage 
(PIA).  In arid areas the amount of water needed to produce crops can be enormous; in 
adopting the PIA formula, the Supreme Court opened the way for tribes to claim huge 
quantities of water. The Court expressly rejected the idea that tribes should just get 
merely a “fair share” of the water in a river or that rights should be determined based on 
reservation populations.  The court said that rights were not to meet present needs, but to 
meet future needs and therefore should be set according to the reservation’s full capacity 
to use water.   
 
A court seeking to determine how much land is irrigable and how much water is 
required for irrigation must examine evidence of soil type, structure, and depth, 
topography, salinity content, possible crops, and climate.  As this information usually is 
based on expert studies in hydrology, soil science, engineering, and economics, trials can 





B.  Tribal Rights are Determined by State Courts 
 
The United States has two separate court systems, state and federal.  The 
individual court systems of the fifty states have local courts with general jurisdiction and 
appellate court systems.  These state courts usually handle water rights matters arising 
within a particular state.  The United States generally is not subject to the jurisdiction of 
state courts, and the principle of sovereign immunity provides that the United States 
cannot be sued without its consent.  Thus, ordinarily state courts would not be able to 
adjudicate federal reserved water rights.  Similarly, Indian tribes are also considered 
sovereign governments with sovereign immunity from suit without their consent or the 
consent of the U.S. Congress. 
 
Federal courts, with district courts sitting in every state and a separate system of 
appeals, have more limited jurisdiction than state courts.  The primary task of federal 
courts is adjudicating “federal questions,” including interpretation and application of 
federal laws.  This can include determining how much water a tribe would be entitled to 
use for a reservation established under a treaty or agreement with the United States.  The 
U.S. Congress decided in the 1950s, however, that when a state court takes jurisdiction 
over the adjudication of all water rights in a river, the United States will waive its 
sovereign immunity to suit and the state court can determine all federal water rights.  It 
passed a law authorizing state courts to adjudicate Indian reserved rights, called the 
McCarran Amendment of 1952 (43 U.S.C.A. sec. 666). 
 
Congress recognized in the McCarran Amendment the importance to non-Indians 
of knowing clearly the extent of water rights of others with whom they compete for water 
in times of shortage under the prior appropriation doctrine.  The law applies to all water 
rights of which the United States is the “owner.”  Although the United States only holds 
title to Indian water rights in trust for the tribes, the Supreme Court has held that 
Congress intended to extend state jurisdiction over those rights whenever the rights to an 
entire river were being adjudicated (Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976)).  This caused great concern for tribes because 
they feared that state courts were likely to be less equitable to them than federal courts.  
There is a history of tension between tribes and states.  The Supreme Court long ago 
described the situation of Indians relative to states: “They owe no allegiance to the states, 
and receive from them no protection.  Because of local ill feeling the people of the States 
where they are found are often their deadliest enemies” (United States v. Kagama, 118 
U.S. 375, 384 (1886)). 
 
After the Supreme Court made it clear that Indian water rights were subject to 
determination in state courts, many states initiated “general stream adjudications” -- legal 
proceedings involving sometimes tens of thousands of water rights claimants in an entire 
river basin.  These cost and complexity of these proceedings have proved burdensome to 
everyone.  Some of these adjudications have continued for over twenty years and have 
 25
not neared completion.  Today, there are over sixty Indian water rights cases pending in 
state courts. 
 
Although Indians believed that state courts would not provide fair trials for their 
water rights claims, the results have been mixed.  In most cases the tribes have been able 
to prevail on the United States as their trustee to furnish lawyers and expert witnesses.  
Alliances of government and tribal lawyers have presented cases competently to the 
courts.  In some cases, the state courts have awarded tribes impressively high quantities 
of water.  Yet the overall record is not reassuring to critics who say that relegating tribal 
rights to the mercies of state courts is bound to be unfair to Indians.   
 
In the adjudication of the Big Horn River, for example, the Wyoming Supreme 
Court affirmed the right the tribes of the Wind River Reservation to some 400,000 acre-
feet of water, most of the water in the river (In re General Adjudication of All Rights to 
Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, affirmed, Wyoming v. United 
States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989)).  Undeniably, the amount of water, based on a lower court’s 
determination of the amount of irrigable acreage on the reservation, is enormous.  Yet the 
state supreme court rejected the tribes’ claims for water to be used for mineral 
development, fisheries, wildlife, and aesthetics.  It also rejected the tribes’ attempt to 
extend their reserved water rights to groundwater.  Many scholars and at least some other 
courts differ with each of these holdings.  Whether or not the state court erred in defining 
the scope of the tribes’ reserved water rights, it awarded them enough water to 
overshadow the impacts of those parts of the decision.  The state challenged the decision 
in the United States Supreme Court but the state court decision was upheld, although 
barely; the Justices on the Supreme Court were divided by a vote of four to four. 
 
The Big Horn case is the only state court adjudication of Indian water rights that 
has proceeded through final judgment and appeal to the Supreme Court.  But other state 
courts have handed down rulings in general stream adjudications, some favorable and 
some unfavorable to Indian tribes.  In Arizona, the state supreme court has held that the 
treatment of groundwater under state law as a resource that is allocated and managed 
under a regime entirely separate from surface water could not affect any rights the tribes 
had to groundwater under the reserved rights doctrine because those rights were a matter 
of federal law (San Carlos Apache Tribe v. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 
1999)).  In Idaho, however, the state courts have rejected tribal claims to exemption from 
the state adjudication process under the McCarran Amendment (In re Snake River Basin 




C.  Negotiated Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims as an Alternative to 
Litigation 
 
The results in state court adjudications of Indian water rights vary, but all are 
terribly costly and take years to conclude.  The combination of unpredictability and the 
burdens of litigation have induced all parties to consider seriously negotiation as an 
alternative to litigation.  Since the 1980s there have been about 18 negotiated settlements 
of Indian water rights.  Settlement negotiations usually are commenced after a tribe or the 
United States becomes involved in litigation with a state and non-Indian water users.  
Sometimes this is part of a general stream adjudication started by a state under the 
McCarran Amendment.  It also can follow litigation in federal courts brought by the tribe 
or the United States.  In a few cases settlement negotiations have begun without 
litigation. 
 
Negotiations typically allow for all interested parties to participate.  Sometimes 
they require court decisions to decide basic legal questions like the tribe’s priority date.  
Negotiations are most useful when there are factual disagreements based on technical 
data.  Rather than dwell on these contests, the parties seek to craft a solution that will 
satisfy at least some of their respective needs.  Instead of an all-or-nothing court decision 
with a clear-cut victory for one side, they seek ways to provide recognition for tribal 
water rights without jeopardizing existing water uses.  Although the tribes may not 
receive the full quantities of water originally or potentially claimed, they often get money 
– mostly from the federal government – to enable them to build facilities to put their 
quantified water rights to use.   
 
The “lubrication” of federal funding has been a key element in most Indian water 
rights settlements.  It has allowed for tribes to secure not only paper water rights, but also 
“wet water” delivered through irrigation systems and pipelines for domestic supplies. At 
the same time, non-Indians have gained assurance that they can continue using water 
under water rights that are junior to tribal water rights.  Sometimes federal or state 
funding is also assured for projects that benefit non-Indian water users.  Because funding 
is usually part of a settlement package, an agreement reached by the various parties in 
negotiation usually must be approved and monies appropriated by Congress.  Thus, 
settlements are almost always accompanied by federal, and sometimes accompanying 
state legislation.  Although each Indian water rights settlement is unique, several 
examples illustrate how they work.   
 
Congress has approved two water settlements in Arizona.  In 1978, the Ak-Chin 
Indian Community agreed with the Secretary of the Interior to forgo a substantial amount 
of water claims against non-Indian users in exchange for 85,000 acre-feet of irrigation 
water provided by a federal well-field water project (Public Law No. 95-328, 42 Stat. 409 
(1978); Public Law No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (1984); Public Law No. 102-497, 106 Stat. 
3528 (1992)).  Using the well water on the Ak-Chin reservation, however, would deplete 
the groundwater under the Papago Indian reservation.  In order to avoid this problem, the 
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Department of Interior renegotiated a water contract with an irrigation district, which 
received its water from the Colorado River to deliver its surplus water to the tribe.  In 
1982, the San Xavier Band of the Tohono O’Odham Nation first settled its groundwater 
claims without involving the federal government in the settlement process.  The tribe 
could not proceed without the federal government participation and financial support in 
the final water settlement.  The bill was ultimately approved (Public Law No. 97-293, 96 
Stat. 1274 (1982)).  These water settlements exemplify successful water negotiations, 
which provide the tribes with promises for delivered water and a consideration of their 
reserved water rights. 
 
Each settlement is different because the legal, geographic, and economic 
situations of tribes vary and so do the political factors.  The ability of tribe and its 
neighbors in one state to achieve a settlement will differ with the relative power of the 
members of Congress that represent that state.  The receptiveness of Congress to 
settlements will also vary depending on the economic health of the federal government at 
the time a settlement package is presented.  Notwithstanding the inevitable differences 
among them, a review of the Indian water rights settlements to date that are summarized 
in Figure 1 shows several characteristics that are common to many of them.   
 
• Federal investment in water or water facilities.  By providing funds to build 
dams and delivery works, the settlement can ensure delivery of water to both 
Indians and non-Indians. 
 
• Non-federal cost-sharing.  A typical condition of providing federal funds is that 
state or local governments bear a portion of the cost of the settlement. 
 
• Creation of tribal trust fund.  Cash funds are usually appropriated for the use of 
the tribes.  Sometimes the money is to be used for water development and 
sometimes it is available generally for economic development. 
 
• Limited off-reservation water marketing.  For various reason, tribes that are 
entitled to water rights cannot or do not want to use all of their water on their 
reservations.  Allowing them to lease water for use by non-Indians off the 
reservation can provide cash income that can help build the tribe’s economic self-
sufficiency while allowing non-Indians to use water they need.  Under the legal 
systems governing water in the West, water rights can be transferred with few 
restrictions beyond protection of other water rights holders.  Denying tribes the 
same right seems inequitable.  Most settlement packages allow the tribes to 
market their water but nearly all restrict these transfers more than the transfer of 
non-Indian water rights are restricted. 
 
• Deference to state law.  Often the settlements require that Indian water use be 
subject to state water law, at least when the water is used off the reservation.  
Where two or more states enter into a compact allocating the use of a river that is 
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the source of water used to satisfy tribal water rights claims, the Indian water 
rights settlement agreement and accompanying legislation usually provide that the 
compact will govern water use. 
 
• Concern for efficiency, conservation, and the environment.  Less pervasive 
among the settlements but included in many of them is a provision for improving 
the efficiency of water use and advancing environmental values.  
 
• Benefits for Non-Indians.  Perhaps the most important characteristic of Indian 
water settlements in terms of giving them political viability is that they provide 
benefits for non-Indians.  At a minimum, they receive certainty that their 
established water uses can continue.  If the United States agrees to build water 
facilities they may get access to water that will allow new uses.  In some cases, 
non-Indians have been able to obtain federal funding for projects that otherwise 
would have been politically impossible.  They have succeeded in the context of 




D.  Current Issues 
 
1.  Finality of Determinations of Rights 
 
One of the goals of non-Indians in seeking quantification of Indian rights is to 
provide the certainty they need in order to make investments and borrow money to build 
water projects and to develop their lands.  This was surely a motive for enactment of the 
McCarran Amendment.  Tribes also can benefit from knowing the extent of their rights as 
they try to attract investments in water facilities and otherwise to realize value from the 
important asset of water rights.  Yet the tribes that have had their water rights adjudicated 
have learned that they must suffer the consequences if they have inadequate legal 
representation in the litigation of their claims.  Even if mistakes are made, they cannot 
later return to court and ask for their water rights to be adjusted because that would 
disrupt non-Indian expectations.  The likelihood that the outcome of a quantification will 
be immutable raises a serious concern for any tribe embarking on a quantification of its 
water rights.   
 
In two cases where tribes had their rights fixed in the past and wanted to reopen 
cases to expand their rights, the Supreme Court has refused to allow any change in tribal 
rights.  In Arizona v. California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)) five tribes along the Colorado 
River had been represented in court by the U.S. Department of Justice.  Attorneys for the 
U.S. failed to claim all of the tribes’ practicably irrigable acreage.  Thus, the tribes’ water 
rights were limited to the quantity needed for the irrigable lands claimed by the 
government.  The tribes later hired their own lawyers and experts and reopened the case.  
They proved that additional lands were irrigable and asked the Supreme Court to award a 
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greater quantity of water.  But the Supreme Court in 1983, twenty years after the original 
decision, held that the quantification could not be changed except where there was 
actually an error in boundaries that a court had corrected (Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 
605 (1983)).  The Supreme Court said there is a “strong interest in finality” in western 
water law and therefore it would be unfair to the non-Indians who had relied on the 
earlier decision if the tribes were allowed to increase their claims.   
 
In another case, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe also had depended on the United 
States to protect its interests in court.  Early in the twentieth century the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation built a federal irrigation project to benefit non-Indian farmers.  The tribe 
historically depended on fishing, and its reservation consisted almost entirely of a large 
lake.  The federal water project diverted nearly all of the water from the single stream 
that supplied water to the lake.  The U.S. went to state court to secure the necessary water 
right before building the project.  Purporting to represent both the tribe and the irrigation 
project, the federal government claimed only water rights sufficient to irrigate the Indian 
lands in the narrow ring of land around the lake, and claimed no water to maintain the 
Indians’ fishery.  Without water to sustain the fishery and the lake level, the lake shrunk 
and the fish started to die off. 
 
Years later the tribe, through its own attorneys, proved that the U.S. had failed to 
claim sufficient water rights due to its conflict of interest and got a lower court to order 
the government to take action consistent with its trust responsibility and stop diverting all 
the water to the reclamation project.  The U.S. also was forced to reopen the old case that 
had given the tribe inadequate water rights.  But, on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court 
refused to let the case be reopened, citing the interest of the non-Indians in having 
certainty in their water rights (Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 
F.Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), supplemented by 360 F.Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), reversed, 
499 F.2d 1095 (D.C.Cir. 1974), certiorari denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975)). 
 
The outcomes in these two cases make it imperative for tribes whose reserved 
water rights are being determined to participate fully and aggressively in asserting the full 
extent of those rights.  This is difficult for tribes with limited financial resources.  In 
recent times the United States has provided funding for some tribes for lawyers and 
experts, however, even when it has represented the tribes as a trustee.   
 
The daunting specter of a final and unalterable judgment may provide an 
argument against seeking an adjudication of reserved water rights.  In most cases, 
however, tribes have no choice about whether to adjudicate their rights because the 
United States can be sued any time a state initiates a general stream adjudication and 
must claim all federal and Indian water rights.  Although the tribe, as a sovereign 
government, remains immune from being sued, the rulings of the Supreme Court teach 
that if the tribe abstains from the litigation it does so at its peril.   
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2.  Water Marketing 
 
One of the most controversial questions concerning Indian water rights is whether 
tribes can sell or lease their water to non-Indians outside their reservations.  In many 
cases, the government decided that Indians should become farmers, and moved them to 
reservations for that purpose.  Some tribes do not have a cultural tradition that is based on 
agriculture, however, or are unable to produce a livelihood because they were put on 
reservations that are too small or that have poor lands for farming.  This has led some 
tribes to consider allowing others to use their water off the reservation.  As we have 
explained earlier, most of the negotiated settlements of Indian water rights provide for 
some off-reservation use of tribal water rights, although it is typically restricted in 
location and scope. 
  
Non-Indians control the best agricultural lands on many reservations.  The 
allotment policy opened up the reservations to non-Indian settlement; today, non-Indians 
cultivate 69% of all farmland and have 78% of the irrigated acreage on reservation lands 
throughout the nation.  Moreover, in the last one hundred years, the allotments issued to 
individual Indians have descended through inheritance to an unwieldy number of heirs.  
The only way to put these lands to use is to lease them, usually to non-Indian farmers.  A 
share of the tribe’s reserved water rights attaches to allotted lands and the right to use 
water can go with a lease to non-Indians (Skeem v. United States, 273 Fed. 93 (9th Cir. 
1921); 25 U.S.C. sec. 415). 
  
There is considerable debate about whether tribes should have the legal right to 
allow their water rights to be used outside their reservations, however.  Opponents of 
Indian water marketing argue that the nature of the reserved right is to make reservation 
lands useful and this purpose is not fulfilled when water is used elsewhere.  Proponents 
say that the ultimate purpose of the reservations was to provide a homeland where 
Indians could be self-sufficient.  This goal may be best achieved if tribes can enter the 
marketplace and realize the economic value of tribal resources.   
 
Off-reservation Indian water marketing could provide a way to continue and 
expand non-Indian uses.  Simply paying Indians for the right to use their water could buy 
the certainty that is now lacking for non-Indian users.  Nevertheless, non-Indians who 
have depended on using undeveloped Indian water without charge do not want to be 
forced to start paying for it.  They have raised policy and legal arguments against 
marketability. 
 
The most substantial legal question about Indian water marketing is whether a 
tribe has the legal right to convey what is essentially a property right.  One of the oldest 
rules of Indian law is that tribes cannot transfer land or rights in land to non-Indians 
without the participation or approval of the United States government (Johnson v. 
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C.A. sec. 177).  
Any legal doubt on this point can be resolved by obtaining congressional consent.  This 
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consent was granted in several negotiated Indian water settlements that allowed water 
marketing.  Action by Congress also moots the issue of whether there is a fundamental 
conflict between the Supreme Court’s original rationale for reserved water rights and a 
tribe’s use of them outside the reservation.  In any event the legal restraint on alienation 
of Indian property is intended to protect Indian rights from encroachment by non-Indians 
or the states.  This suggests that the primary concern in whether Indian water should be 
marketable is whether the tribes have been dealt with fairly.   Presumably, congressional 
approval should depend on a finding that it is in the best interests of the tribe.   
 
Some observers have proposed that Congress should authorize tribes to lease their 
water rights subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior just as tribes can now 
lease tribal lands with secretarial approval.  One of the arguments offered in favor of 
Indian water leasing is that non-Indians may freely transfer their water and water rights 
so long as the rights of others are not harmed.  Therefore, it is inequitable to deny tribes 
the same attributes for its water rights.  As yet, Congress has not seriously considered 
legislation for Indian water leasing. 
 
 
3.  Tribal Water Codes and Administration 
 
As sovereigns over their members and territory, Indian tribes can legislate and 
regulate water rights.  Their ability to do so has been frustrated, however, by political 
impediments to the federal government’s approval of tribal water codes and by some 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court that limit the reach of tribal regulatory authority 
over non-Indians on reservations. 
 
It is clear that a state has no jurisdiction to regulate Indian use of Indian water 
rights.  This is part of a 150-year legal tradition of maintaining tribal jurisdiction over 
Indians and their property on reservations, free from state control.  The harder question is 
under what circumstances non-Indians on an Indian reservation can be controlled by 
tribes and when they are subject to state jurisdiction.  Generally, if non-Indians are on 
Indian land, they like Indians can be subjected to tribal jurisdiction.  The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in this area have created doubts about whether tribes can regulate non-
Indians, especially if they are on non-Indian owned land.   
 
One case says that a tribe may have jurisdiction over a non-Indian on its 
reservation, even on the non-Indian’s fee land, if the non-Indian’s conduct would threaten 
or have a “direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and 
welfare of the tribe” (450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).  The use of waterways on a reservation 
presumably would affect some or all of these interests.  But in a case dealing specifically 
with the applicability of a tribal water code, United States v. Anderson (736 F.2d 1358 
(9th Cir. 1984)), the court held that the tribe lacked the requisite interest to regulate.  This 
was because the stream in question originated outside the reservation, ran only a short 
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way along the reservation boundary, then turned away and joined the Spokane River 
outside the reservation.   
 
In Holly v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation (655 F. 
Supp. 557 (E.D. Wash. 1985), affirmed subnom, Holly v. Totus, 812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 
1987), certiorari denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987)) the same court upheld the application of a 
tribal water code to non-Indians using water on their land within the reservation where 
the stream was entirely on the reservation.  The court added, however, that the tribe could 
not control “excess” water used by non-Indians – presumably water not subject to 
reserved water rights.  
 
It would appear that tribes with comprehensive, well-developed codes and 
regulations governing waters on their reservation would be better able to demonstrate the 
need to regulate non-Indian water to further tribal interests.  For instance, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the exclusive authority of the Mescalero Apache Tribe to regulate 
game and fish on its reservation, including hunting and fishing by non-Indians (New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983)).  This case did not deal with 
regulation on non-Indian land, but the court did emphasize the importance to the tribe of 
having unified regulation of a resource like wildlife.  Similarly, the political integrity of 
tribal government control of resources would depend on unified control of water 
resources. 
 
Tribes attempting to enact legislation to regulate water resources on their 
reservations do not have support from the U.S. Department of the Interior.  Perhaps half 
of the tribal constitutions have provisions that require certain tribal legislation to be 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior before it will be effective.  For twenty-six years 
the department has maintained a moratorium on approval of any tribal water codes that 
would extend to non-Indian water use.  On two occasions the department has circulated 
draft regulations governing the approval of such codes, but they were met with a 
firestorm of opposition from western senators and congressmen.  The federal government 
has departed from the moratorium in only a few cases to approve tribal codes as part of 
negotiated water settlements approved by Congress. 
 
The last administration voiced sympathy for the tribal effort to regulate water 
resources, but did not change the policy.  Secretary Bruce Babbitt said that if a tribe 
wanted to enact a water code and confronted a requirement for secretarial approval, as is 
the case in many tribal constitutions, all the tribe had to do was to amend its constitution 
to remove the requirement for secretarial approval of ordinances, and he would approve 
the amendment removing the approval requirement so the tribe could adopt a water code 
without the need for federal approval.  Although not all tribes have a secretarial approval 
requirement for tribal codes, and those that do may have a means to remove the 
impediment, the apparent policy of the Department of the Interior disfavoring tribal codes 
could portend difficulties if code enforcement is challenged by a non-Indian and a court 
is called upon to examine the tribe’s authority to enact the provision. 
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Notwithstanding the uncertain area of tribal water code enforcement over non-
Indians within a reservation, many tribes have sophisticated codes.  Some have well-
trained professionals on the staffs of water resources departments that do water resources 




4.  Use of Rights for New Purposes   
 
Reserved water rights can be quantified for any purpose for which the federal 
government established an Indian reservation.  As described earlier, the most commonly 
expressed purpose for creating reservations was to enable the Indians to pursue 
agriculture, but reserved rights can arise from other purposes.  For example, in 
historically important fishing and hunting areas reservations were located to provide 
access to rivers and lakes to enable the continuation of these traditional lifestyles.   
 
In United States v. Adair (753 D.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), certiorari denied 
Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984)), the court found that a treaty provision 
guaranteeing the Klamath Tribe the exclusive right to hunt, fish, and gather on its 
reservation showed the primary purpose for creating the reservation.  Other parts of the 
treaty mentioned agriculture; the court found that encouraging the Indians to take up 
farming was a second essential purpose of the reservation.  Although state law did not 
allow water rights for fishing and hunting, the court held that the Indians had such a right 
which could be enforced to prevent non-Indians from depleting streams below levels that 
were required to maintain streamflows for fish and game.   
 
A more difficult question arises when a tribe wants to use water for purposes 
other than those for which its reserved water rights were quantified.  For instance, if 
rights were quantified for agricultural uses, can a tribe use the water for industrial 
purposes, or for a fishery, or even to water a golf course?  When the Supreme Court 
approved the report of a Special Master and decided the reserved water rights of tribes on 
the Colorado River, the Master’s report said that tribes’ use of water was not limited to 
the uses that were the basis of quantification.  In Arizona v. California (439 U.S. 419 
(1979)) in 1979 the Court approved this report.   
  
In the Big Horn adjudication, the court quantified the tribes’ reserved rights based 
on irrigable acreage (753 P.2d 76, 98 (Wyo. 1988), affirmed, Wyoming v. United States, 
492 U.S. 406 (1989)).  The Wind River Tribes decided to use a portion of these rights to 
restore streamflows within the reservation and build up the fishery.  They recognized an 
opportunity to recover the natural ecosystem and to reap economic benefits from tourism 
and recreational uses by attracting anglers.  Non-Indian water users on the reservation 
who would have had to leave water in the stream instead of diverting it for irrigation 
objected.  The state supreme court rejected the tribes’ attempt to use water for instream 
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flows, saying that any change in use would have to be in accordance with Wyoming state 
law, which does not recognize such instream uses as “beneficial” (In re General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d 273 
(Wyo. 1992)).  The United States Supreme Court did not review the decision. 
  
If a tribe changes its water rights to uses that were not the basis for a 
quantification of reserved rights and this must be approved under state law, the matter 
will be reviewed under the so-called “no injury” rule.  This rule applies to all changes in 
use under the prior appropriation system.  Limiting tribes to one use and prohibiting all 
changes would be inconsistent with that system of water rights.  When prior appropriators 
change their use they must show that no other water users are hurt by the change.  If the 
no injury rule were applied to Indian reserved water rights it could render them useless.  
Recall that tribes generally have not been able to raise the capital needed to put water 
rights to use.  On the Wind River Reservation, for instance, the federal government 
financed an irrigation system that has served mostly non-Indians and the Indians have 
made little use of the system.  Commencing Indian uses on Wind River and in other river 
basins where hundreds of non-Indian water users have built their investments on the use 
of water that the tribe, as the senior water rights holder, could have claimed, is bound to 
cause injury. 
 
There is no doubt that the equities of established non-Indian water users deserve 
consideration.  The non-Indian irrigators are neighbors and they are not responsible for 
the way the system from which they benefit was developed and for the fact that it has 
operated to the detriment of the Indians.  The government created the system and the non-
Indians inherited the situation.  So the non-Indians reasonably expected that the present 
conditions would continue.  On the other hand, they have been using Indian water to 
build their wealth.  Under these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to apply the no 
injury rule mechanically.  This would halt tribal progress and extend even longer the 
already long-delayed tribal benefits from use of reserved water rights.   
 
Walker and Williams propose that tribes like those on the Wind River Reservation 
exercise their authority to administer and regulate water rights on their reservations and 
in doing so take control over the “change of use” question (Walker and Williams 1991).  
They can adopt criteria for “sensible water use policies for all reservation citizens” non-
Indian as well as Indian (Walker and Williams 1991, 5:10).  Some non-Indians have 
relied on state permits to use water diverted on the reservation that are over eighty years 
old.  Walker and Williams urge that tribes “balance the complex interests of these non-
Indians against . . . [t]he unique historical circumstances of water development on Indian 
reservations [that] may well compel compromise” (Walker and Williams 1991, 5:9).  
They say that one such compromise would be for tribes to adopt a public interest standard 
for tribal reservation water administration and apply it in a way that considers, along with 
other equities, the injury to juniors of changing the use of reserved water rights. 
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E.  Conclusion 
  
The doctrine of Indian reserved water rights is certainly a potent force for tribes.  
Yet its application has not justified the worries of non-Indians.  First, only a handful of 
tribes – fewer than thirty – have finally determined the extent of their rights.  Of those, 
only a few have put a significant portion of their water rights to use.  Consequently, non-
Indians have not been affected adversely by Indian water use.  As Richard Collins wrote:   
 
[T]his situation has generated powerful political and financial forces that oppose 
Indian development, of which there has been very little.  There have been 
extravagant claims of the threat posed by Indian water claims, but actual conflict 
has been almost entirely a war of words, paper, and lawyers.  Indian calls are not 
shutting anyone’s headgates (Collins 1985, 56:482). 
  
The doctrine is strong in theory and the challenge to lawyers and tribal leaders is 
to give it potency in practice.  The fora for doing this are many.  The processes for 
adjudication or negotiation for determining reserved water rights are expensive and 
arduous.  They are also uneven in result, depending as they do on the fortuity of how 
much political power a particular state’s congressional delegation wields and the timing 
relative to the nation’s economic health.  Once tribal rights are quantified they will 
remain unused because of a shortage of capital, restrictions on marketing, and limits on 
changes of use.  The tribes must also be able to exercise comprehensive control over the 
water when there are non-Indian users within the reservation.  Achieving justice and 
equity for Indians, then, depends not only on have a generous legal foundation but fair 
and reasonable means to use and regulate water resources. 
 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 
4.  Critique and Conclusions 
 
Author’s Note:  This section will be completed based on reviews by other experts, input 
from the panel, and discussion at the conference.  Some points that may be covered 
include: 
o Both environmental interests and Indian tribes have run into the problem of long-
established water rights – system protects the status quo above all. 
o Historical allocation rules have changed over the years to reflect broader public 
concerns and equities of interests not protected in original allocations. 
o States have been inconsistent in their willingness to change laws to reflect these 
interests, so the federal government has taken a more active role. 
o Looking ahead: Economic and social forces driving water use will encourage 
more movement in these directions – water for urban use, recreation, and 
environmental protection.  Recognizing and protecting public, cultural, and other 
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